No Response
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Thus the sophistical fabric has been demolished, chiefly by appealing
to the analogy of the arts. 'Justice is like the arts (1) in having no
external interest, and (2) in not aiming at excess, and (3) justice is
to happiness what the implement of the workman is to his work.' At this
the modern reader is apt to stumble, because he forgets that Plato is
writing in an age when the arts and the virtues, like the moral
and intellectual faculties, were still undistinguished. Among early
enquirers into the nature of human action the arts helped to fill up
the void of speculation; and at first the comparison of the arts and the
virtues was not perceived by them to be fallacious. They only saw the
points of agreement in them and not the points of difference. Virtue,
like art, must take means to an end; good manners are both an art and
a virtue; character is naturally described under the image of a statue;
and there are many other figures of speech which are readily transferred
from art to morals. The next generation cleared up these perplexities;
or at least supplied after ages with a further analysis of them. The
contemporaries of Plato were in a state of transition, and had not yet
fully realized the common-sense distinction of Aristotle, that 'virtue
is concerned with action, art with production' (Nic. Eth.), or that
'virtue implies intention and constancy of purpose,' whereas 'art
requires knowledge only'. And yet in the absurdities which follow from
some uses of the analogy, there seems to be an intimation conveyed that
virtue is more than art. This is implied in the reductio ad absurdum
that 'justice is a thief,' and in the dissatisfaction which Socrates
expresses at the final result.